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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERMANS. DALTON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL CO,MMISSION OF UTAH 
WAYNE RASMUSSEN COMPANY, and 
GUARANTEEINSURANCECO~ANY 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8943 
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident which 
occurred on February 13, 1955, while he was driving a 
car from Rock Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah, for 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company. Thereafter he filed a 
claim with the Industrial Commission of Utah for benefits 
under the Workmen's Compensation Statutes. The first 
hearing was held before the Industrial Commission on 
October 17, 1956. At that hearing it was stipulated 
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between the parties that the sole issue to be determined 
was whether or not there was a contract of employment 
existing between the Defendant, Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany, and the plaintiff, Sherman S. Dalton. (R. 11). On 
October 9, 1957, plaintiff's recommended findings of fact 
and conclusions of law were adopted by the Industrial 
Commission. (R. 71, 72, 73). The Commission found 
that the plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and 
the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injuries arose out 
of or in the course of his employment. (R. 72) . On 
November 12, 1957, defendant filed a petition for rehear-
ing to redetermine the question of whether or not there 
was a contract of employment existing between the plain-
tiff and defendant and to determine if the medical expenses 
incurred by the applicant were reasonable. (R. 77). On 
November 26, 1957, the Commission ordered that the 
application for rehearing be granted. (R. 78). The re-
hearing was held on February 10, 1958. On April 2, 
19 58, the Commission reversed its former holding and 
found that the plaintiff was not an employee of the Wayne 
Rasmussen Company, but was either a volunteer or an 
independent contractor. The Commission entered the 
following decision: 
((The above entitled cause came on regularly 
for hearing at Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 
17, 1956 at 10:00 o'clock A.M., before the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, pursuant to Order 
and Notice of the Commission. Applicant was 
present and represented by John L. Black, attorney; 
defendants were present and represented by Grant 
C. Aadnesen, attorney. 
A further hearing was held at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on February 10, 1958, at 9:00 o'clock A.M. 
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The attorneys above mentioned represented the 
parties. 
On October 9, 19 57 the Commission made an 
award in favor of applicant. Subsequently, de-
fendants filed a Petition for Rehearing which was 
granted by formal Order of the Commission on 
November 26, 1957. It was stipulated that the 
transcript of the first hearing should be made a part 
of the record on rehearing. 
Two issues were submitted on rehearing, first, 
whether or not the applicant was an employee of 
defendant, Wayne Rasmussen Company on Feb-
ruary 13, 19 55, and, second, the reasonableness of 
the medical and hospital bills submitted to de-
fendants for payment. The· second issue was not 
considered at the first hearing. 
We have carefully reviewed the testimony 
submitted at the first hearing and studied the 
memoranda filed by counsel. 
The $25.00 paid to applicant and his partner 
was, we believe, expense money rather than wages. 
In all respects, this case is on all fours with the 
Oberhansly case. Therefore, we hold that Oher-
hansly v. Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P.2d 1093, 
5 Utah 2d 15 is controlling. 
We therefore find that applicant was not 
an employee of defendant, Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany on February 13, 1955, the date of the acci-
dent and injury, but that he was either a volunteer 
or an independent contractor. 
IT IS THEREFORE O·RDERED. that the 
application is denied." (R. 96). 
Plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing on April 23, 1957 
(R. 97). This petition was denied by the Industrial 
Commission on July 17, 1957 (R. 126). 
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In view of the rule that the decision of the Commis-
sion will not be disturbed if supported by any substantial 
evidence, and in order to assist the court, we feel it neces-
sary to restate the facts of the case. 
Dalton and a Mr. Porter owned and operated an 
automobile parts and body shop. Although they leased 
the back part of a building owned by the Wayne Ras-
mussen Company, they operated their business entirely in-
dependent of the Wayne Rasmussen Company. 
Wayne Rasmussen Company held the Studebaker 
franchise in Ogden, Utah. Part of the business of the 
Wayne Rasmussen Company was buying and selling used 
cars. (R. 46). When the new car business slowed up a 
little, Wayne Rasmussen Company would buy used cars 
in Idaho, Wyoming, New Mexico or Arizona and bring 
them back to Utah. (R. 47). The cars were driven to 
Utah by various people. (R. 48). Purkey, office manager 
and bookkeeper for Wayne Rasmussen Company and the 
Porter Dalton partnership, testified: 
uQ. Do you know what people were used, in the 
past to obtain these cars and drive them back? 
A. Well, we had a Mr. A. J. Hansen and Scotty 
Metheny. They had been there for several years 
with Mr. Rasmussen as salesmen and, if the busi-
ness slowed up a little, in the new business, then we 
went out and tried to pick up something to make 
some n1oney in the used car business and some-
times they would buy them themselves and bring 
them back or get somebody to help them bring 
them back. Then there would be other times that 
Mr. Rasmussen would go and bring them, and 
sometimes Metheny and Hansen would go pick 
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them \lP or take someone with them to pick them 
up. 
*~··* 
Q. And do you know of any other employees, 
other than the two you have mentioned, that were 
ever sent to bring cars in? 
A. Well no, other than Mr. Dalton and Mr. Porter . 
. Q. On this occasion that we have talked about 
today? 
A. Yes, then we had others, that l can't remember 
their names. They were short-term ·employees, 
see." (R. 46, 47, 48) 
On or about February 11, 1955, Naylor, the Sales 
Manager for Wayne Rasmussen Company, approached 
Dalton and asked him if he and his partner, Porter, could 
go to- Rock Springs, Wyoming, to drive two cars hack to 
Ogden, Utah (R. 16). Naylor told Dalton he had a 
((deal" with somebody to get the cars but that they weren't 
going to go and that it had caused an emergency (R. 16). 
Purkey who was present during the conversation between 
Naylor and Dalton relative to picking up the cars, testi-
fied: 
((Mr. Naylor had these two cars up there and 
he thought that he had some other parties to go get 
them. Well, I believe it was Friday afternoon or 
Saturday morning, I can't remember which, that 
these other parties called him up and said they 
couldn't go. So Mr. Naylor was worried about 
who he could get and I believe that Jack came up, 
Mr. Dalton came up into the parts or to the front 
of the office and Mr. Naylor told him that he had 
these two cars there, and Mr. Dalton said, rrw ell, 
we will go get them." I don't remember just when 
that was, whether that was Friday or Saturday, but 
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anyway the arrangements was made that they 
should go get them and I was to give them a check 
for $25.00." (R. 49-50). (Italics ours) 
On Saturday, February 12th, Dalton told Naylor 
that he and his partner could go get the cars. (R. 17). 
Naylor made arrangements for transportation by bus to 
Rock Springs because it was Saturday morning and Dalton 
was too busy to get away and make the arrangements. 
(R. 17). Naylor told Dalton the departure and arrival 
time of the bus, where the garage in Rock Springs was 
located, to have the cars :filled with gas and to charge it 
to Wayne Rasmussen Company, and if they had any 
trouble on the way to pay for It and they would be reim-
bursed for the money spent. (R. 18) . Naylor gave Dalton 
a check for $25.00 (R. 18). Dalton bought the bus 
tickets out of the $25.00 for himself and Porter. (R. 18). 
Dalton and Porter caught the bus in Ogden, Utah, at 2:00 
or 3:00 p.m. on Saturday afternoon. They arrived in 
Rock Springs at 7:00 p.m. that night, and went to the 
garage where the cars were located. (R. 19, 20}. Dalton 
signed the tickets for the gasoline which had been put in 
the cars and then he and Porter went to a cafe to eat. (R. 
20). After they finished eating Dalton and Porter started 
for Ogden, each driving a separate car. Somewhere be-
tween Rock Springs and Evanston, Wyoming, they had 
a quart of oil put in one of the cars (R. 3 8). When they 
arrived in Evanston they stopped at the Freeman Hotel 
and had a cup of coffee and rested a few minutes, and then 
proceeded on to Ogden (R. 20) . About 18 miles west of 
Evanston the plaintiff's car hit some ice on the road, went 
into a spin and sideswiped a telephone pole, which resulted 
in plaintiff's injuries. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
APPELLENT WAS A VOLUNTEER OR AN IN-
DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL CO·MMISSION GRANTED 
THE REHEARING FO·R THE EXPRESS PURPOSE 
OF REDETERMINING THE EMPLOYER-EMPLO·YEE 
RELATIONSHIP AND REASO·NABLENESS OF THE 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS A VOLUNTEER OR AN IN-
DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR. 
Section 35-1-85 of the U.C.A. 1953, states: 
35-1-85. Duty of commission to make find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law-Filing-Con-
clusiveness on questions of fact-Review-Court 
judgment.-After each formal hearing, it shall be 
the duty of the commission to make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in writing and file the 
same with its secretary. The findings and con-
clusions of the com.mission on questions of fact 
shall be conclusive and final and sh'all not be sub-
ject to review; such questions of fact shall include 
ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of 
the c01'1'1J11tission. The commission and every party 
to the action or proceeding before the commission 
shall have the right to appear in the review pro-
ceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall enter 
judgment either affirming or setting aside the 
award. (Italics ours) 
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Under this sect!ott and the rule often enunciated by 
this Supreme Court, the findings and conclusions of the 
Commission should be sustained where there is substantial 
evidence to support them. Commission of Finance v. 
Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 83, 239 P.2d 185; 
Camacho v. Industrial Commission, 119 Utah 181, 225 
P.2d. 728. 
In the case at bar the commission made the following 
findings and conclusions: 
uThe $25.00 paid to applicant and his partner 
was, we believe, expense money rather than wages. 
In all respects, this case is on all fours with the 
Oberhansly case. Therefore, we hold that Ober-
hansly v. Travelers Insurance Co., 295 P.2d 1093, 
5 Utah 2d 15, is controlling. 
We therefore find that applicant was not an 
employee of defendant, Wayne Rasmussen COm-
pany on February 13, 1955, the date of the acci-
dent and injury, but that he was either a volunteer 
or an independent contractor." (R. 96) 
Plaintiff has assailed the findings and conclusions of the 
Commission. Although they are binding on this court, 
we will discuss them to show that Dalton was a volunteer 
and even if he was not a volunteer, he must of necessity 
have been an independent contractor. 
The case at bar is controlled by Oberhansly v. Travel-
ers Insurance Company, 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093. 
In that case the plaintiff, Verne J. Oberhansly, obtained 
a judgment against LaMar Pearce and LaMar Pearce Auto 
Mart, a corporation, for personal injuries sustained while 
riding in a car driven by LaMar Pearce, president of the 
LaMar Pearce Auto Mart. Being unable to collect the judg-
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ment because of the involvency of both LaMar Pearce and 
the company, Oberhansly brought suit to collect it from 
Travelers Insurance Company. Travelers had issued its 
standard comprehensive liability policy which was in force 
at the time of the accident to the LaMar Pearce Auto Mart. 
Judgment. in the lower court was for the plaintiff and the 
defendant appealed. Travelers attempted to avoid its 
liability under the policy on two grounds: 
cc ( 1) That respondent was an employee of the 
LaMar Pear,ce Auto Mart, or was such under the 
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
of this state and therefore expressly excluded under 
the terms of the policy, and (2) that the insured 
failed to cooperate with the insurer in defense of 
the action against it in violation of the terms of the 
p·olicy." 
The court stated as to point No. I (P. 1094) : 
ccAs to No. 1, the evidence was uncontradicted 
that respondent was regularly engaged in a business 
of his own in no way connected with the LaMar 
Pearce Auto Mart, but that respondent's brother 
was connected with the company under what 
LaMar Pearce called a partnership agreement, and 
therefore on a few occasions before the occurrence 
of the accident on which this suit is based, had, as a 
favor to this brother, driven cars to Idaho for 
the company and had neither asked nor received 
compensation or even expenses for those trips. 
The company was in financial difficulties and on 
the day the accident occurred, respondent was 
called and asked if he would drive one of two cars 
which the company had decided to return to a 
consignor in Evanston, Wyoming. He consented 
to do so if the expenses were paid by the company • 
and LaMar Pearce gave him $10 for this. The $10 
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was spent for gasoline for all the cars driven on 
this trip and. for meals· and refreshments. LaMar 
Pearce testified that although he had never exer-
. cised any control over the activities of respondent 
' on the few occasions when he had delivered cars 
for the company, he felt that if he had seen him 
drive in a manner which could result in damage 
to the car bein·g returned he could tell him not to 
do so as the cars were his responsibility. Although 
the company maintained Workmen's Compensa-
tion insurance, respondent was not reported as an 
employee on any reports concerning its employees. 
From this evidence the court found that respondent 
was not an employee of the insured at the time 
of the accident within the meaning of that word 
as used in the policy, nor was the insured liable 
under any Workmen's Compensation law for the 
injuries received by respondent. We agree with 
the court's findings. The evidence is conclusive 
that neither LaMar Pearce, who was representing 
the company, nor respondent understood that re-
spondent had been hired to drive the car to 
Evanston, Wyoming. The act was considered by 
all parties concerned to be a voluntary accommoda-
tion. Pearce did not have the right to direct re-
spondent in the manner in which he wished the 
work to be accomplished. He could not discharge 
him for a refusal to do as directed. There was no 
agreement to pay wages or salary. The $10.00 
was given for expenses and not as compensation 
for work." 
The facts in the case at bar are on all fours with the facts of 
the Oberhansly case. 
In the Oberhansly case the respondent was asked to 
drive a car to Evanston, Wyoming, because the company 
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was in financial difficulty. In the case at bar the plaintiff 
volunteered (R. 49) or was asked (R.I6) to drive a car 
from Rock Springs, Wyoming to Ogden, Utah, because 
of an emergency. In both cases the driving was done as 
a voluntary accommodation. In both cases the individuals 
volunteering to drive the cars were regularly engaged in 
a business of their own. In both cases the individuals doing 
the driving were not reported as employees of the com-
panies for whom they were driving (R. 53-54). In the 
Oberhansly case, Pearce, the president of the Auto Mart, 
did not have the right to direct Oberhansly in the manner 
in which he wished the work to be accomplished. Pearce 
could not discharge Ober~ansly for ref~sal to do as di-
rected. There was no agreement for Pearce to pay Ober-. 
hansly a salary or wage. In the case at bar, neither Rasmus-
sen nor Naylor had the right to direct Dalton in the 
manner in which he wanted the driving to be done. Neither 
Rasmussen nor Naylor could discharge Dalton for refusal 
to do as directed and there was no agreement to pay wages 
or salary. In the Oberhansly case the $10.00 given to 
Oberhansly was given for expenses and not as wages. It 
was spent for gasoline, meals and refreshments. In the 
case at bar, the $25.00 was given for expenses and was 
spent for bus tickets (R. 41), meals (R. 20), refresh-
ments (R. 20) and a quart of oil (R. 3 8). 
In the Oberhansly case this court restated the test 
announced in Bingham City Corp. v. Industrial Com.mis-
sion, 66 Utah 390, 243 P. 113, to determine whether a 
workman is an employee: 
ccThe usual test by which to determine whether 
one person is another's employee is whether the 
alleged employer possesses the power to control the 
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other person in respect to the services performed 
by the latter and the power to discharge him for 
disobedience or misconduct. Under the Work-
men's Compensation Act it is also essential that 
some consideration be in fact paid or payable to 
the employee. The purpose of the act is to provide 
compensation for earning power, lost in industry, 
and the only basis for computing compensation is 
the earning ability of the employee in the particu-
lar employment out of which the loss arises. In 
short, the term remployee' indicates a person hired 
to work for wages as the employer may direct. 
* * *" (Italics ours) 
The court concluded its discussion of whether Ober-
hansly was an employee of the LaMar Pearce Auto Mart 
by stating: 
ult is clear from all the evidence that there 
was a reasonable basis for the court to :find there 
was no employee-employer relationship between 
respondent and the insured either under the ordi-
nary meaning of those terms or under the Work-
men's Compensation Act and the court did not 
err in so finding.'' 
Appellant has attempted to distinguish the Ober-
hansly case from the case at bar on the ground that the 
$10.00 given to Oberhansly was for expenses while the 
$25.00 given to Dalton and Porter was for wages. Appel-
lant would have this court believe that if any of the $25.00 
was remaining after Dalton had purchased a bus ticket, 
a meal, refreshments and a quart of oil that it must follow 
that Dalton was an employee. This court has never lim-
ited the test of the employer-employee relationship to such 
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a narrow premise. The test previously announced by this 
court to ascertain if a relationship is that of employer-
employee is to determine whether the alleged employer 
possesses the right to .control the other person in respect 
to the manner and method of the service performed. 
Bingham City Corp. v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
The manner and basis of payment is one element to 
be used in determining whether there is an employer-
employee relationship. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027. The $25.00 
given to Dalton was for expenses. The record is silent as 
to what amount, if any, was left from the $25.00 after 
Dalton had purchased a bus ticket, dinner, refreshments 
and a quart of oil. Even if there was some balance re-
maining from the $25.00, that amount would not be a 
wage. The appellant has failed to show that the evidence 
preponderates against the conclusion of the Commission 
that the $25.00 was to be used for expenses rather than 
wages. That the parties did not consider the $25.00 as a 
wage is shown by Purkey's statement that the money 
Dalton and Porter received was not reported as income 
on their final statement at the end of the year. (R. 63). 
Appellant has also attempted to distinguish the Oher-
hansly case on the ground that Oberhansly rendered a 
service as a favor and a gratuity while Dalton performed 
a service for wages. The record in the case at bar supports 
the finding of the Commission that Dalton rendered a 
service as a voluntary accommodation. 
Purkey testified that when Dalton was informed that 
two cars were in Rock Springs he volunteered frw ell, we 
will go get them." (Italics ours) (R. 49). 
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This statement corroborates the Commission's finding 
that Dalton performed this job of his own free will. 
The record does not support plaintiff's contention 
that Dalton's decision to go to Rock Springs to get the 
cars was motivated by a promise of remuneration. Porter's 
motive for going on the trip was given in response to a 
question concerning the possibility of his going to Rock 
Springs to purchase a used car for his own purpose. He 
stated: 
nw e went on several trips and it was easy to 
tell my wife we were going to look at a car if we 
were going to go out on a binge. And that's the 
truth of it." (R. 65) 
It is important to observe that Porter's statement was 
framed in the plural and obviously included himself as 
well as Dalton. It is also important to note that the state-
ment was made while Porter was being questioned as an 
adverse witness. This statement was given in response to 
a question concerning his prior statement that he went to 
Rock Springs to purchase a used car for his own purpose. 
Dalton and Porter apparently had reasons of their own 
for going to Rock Springs. It might have been to purchase 
used cars for their own purposes or ugo out on a binge." 
From the testimony in the record, the Commission could 
find uthat's the truth of it." 
From the foregoing it is evident that both Porter and 
Dalton were volunteers. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Dalton was 
not a volunteer, then it must follow that he was an inde-
pendent .contractor and not an employee. Section 35-1-42, 
U.C.A. 1953, defines the terms of employee and inde-
pendent contractor: 
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H •• ~Where any employer procures any work 
to be done wholly or in part for hi:fll by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and such work is a part of process in the trade or 
business of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any such 
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the mean-
ing of this section, employees 'of such original 
employer. Any person, firm or corporation en-
gaged in the performance of work as an inde-
pendent contractor shall be deemed· an employer 
within the meaning of this section. The term fin-
dependent contractor,' as herein used, is defined 
to be any person, association or corporation engaged 
in the performance of any work for another, who, 
while so engaged, is independent of the employer 
·in all that pertains to the execution of the work, 
is not subject to the rule or control of the employer, 
is engaged only in the performance of a definite 
job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the em-
ployer only in effecting a result in accordance with 
the employer's design." (Italics ours) 
This court has interpreted this language in a number 
of cases. 
In Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110 U tab 
309, 172 P. 2d 136, this .court stated: 
({From these definitions (given in 35-1-42, 
U.C.A. 1953) it is apparent that whether a work-
man is an (employee' or an (independent con-
tractor' is dependent on (I) whether the employer 
has the right to control his execution of the work, 
( 2) whether the work done or to be done is a part 
or process in the trade or business of the employer, 
and (3) whether the work done or to be done is a 
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definite job or piece of work. (The word (em-
ployer' as used in this opinion refers to the person 
who is having work done, whether the person doing 
the work is an (employee' or an (independent con-
tractor.') 
The court further held that the most important deter-
minative of the relationship between workman and em-
ployer is that of control. 
In Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049, this 
court applied the right to control test. The question be-
fore the court was whether a husband who was riding in 
a car driven by his wife and owned by them jointly had 
the legal right of control. It was held to be a fact ques-
tion. The court stated at page 1051: 
((Control as applied to the operation of an au-
tomobile may be broken down into its elements-
the when, the where, and the how. Complete 
control means that the principal could dictate 
when the car was to be used, the destination or 
where it should go, the route it should take, and 
how it should be driven, whether slow or fast, 
behind or around traffic, inside or outside the lane 
of traffic, etc. It is not necessary that the principal 
should be physically able to so direct or control, 
but only that he has the right to." 
The test used in the Fox case is the same test that 
should be applied in the case at bar. 
The Wayne Rasmussen Company had no right to 
dictate when Dalton drove the car back to Ogden. He 
could have stayed in Rock Springs Saturday night if he 
had desired and returned to Ogden the next morning or 
even Sunday evening. If Dalton had decided not to go, 
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neither Naylor nor Rasmussen had any authority to order 
him to go. The fact that Naylor made transportation 
arrangements for Dalton to Rock Springs does not in any 
way give him the right to direct when the cars were to 
be returned. Assuming that Naylor had gone to Rock 
Springs with Dalton, he had no legal right to tell Dalton 
when he had to drive the car back to Ogden. The very 
nature of the act-driving a car from Rock Sp·rings, 
Wyoming to Ogden, Utah-was the kind of a job which 
indicates that Dalton, and not the Wayne Rasmussen 
Company, had the right to determine when he returned 
to Ogden. 
The company did not have the legal right to direct 
Dalton where to drive the car. Dalton testified that 
there was only one highway going west out of Rock 
Springs and that was U.S. #30 (R. 20). Assuming that 
there were a number of routes from Rock Springs to 
Ogden, the Wayne Rasmussen Company had no legal 
right to tell Dalton which one he should take. Dalton 
was to bring a car back to Ogden, Utah. He had the right 
to determine the route, not the Wayne Rasmussen Com-
pany. (Italics ours). See Parkinson v. Industrial Commis-
sion, supra (where this Court held there was no right 
to direct route of travel where there was only one direct 
rout~ available). 
The company had no right to direct Dalton in the 
manner in which he drove the car. Dalton had the right 
to determine how he drove the automobile, ((whether slow 
or fast, behind or around traffic, inside or outside the 
lane of traffic, etc." Fox v. Lavender, supra. 
In the Fox case this court said that uwhen there is a 
paucity of facts from which any inference as to agency 
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or the lack of it can be had, (the) resolution may depend 
entirely upon -presumptions." This court stated that 
Utah falls within that line of authorities which hold that 
no presumption of agency arises that ·the -driver·. of the 
car is the agent of the owner ·where the owner is not 
present in the automobile. Ferguson vs. Reynolds, 52 
Utah 583, 176 P. 267; McFarlane vs. Winters, 47 Utah 
598, 155 P. 437. 
This court in the Fox case discussed the object of the 
journey as it relates to the question of control. · This court 
said at page 1052: 
uTherefol:"e, the ultimate object of what is to 
be done at the end of the journey is not controlling, 
but simply a circumstance to throw light upon the 
question of whether there was the right of control 
during the journey. The inquiry must still be- di-
rected as to whether an agency existed in the opera-
tion of the car, or the more fundamental question 
of whether there was the right of control on the 
part of another during the time the car was oper-
ated." 
Applying the right to control test it is apparent that 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company did not have the legal 
right to control the when, the where and the how of the 
operation of the automobile. (Italics ours) This is a factual 
question which the Commission resolved in favor of the 
defendants. The record supports the decision of the 
Commission and preponderates against the contentions of 
the plaintiff. 
The second test enunciated in the Parkinson case, supra 
is uwhether the work done or to be done is a part of pro-
cess in the trade or business of the employer .... " 
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In the Parkinson case supra the workman, Molyneaux, 
seeking· compensation, was engaged in the independent 
calling of a trucker. Molyneaux made arrangements with 
one Parkinson, the receiver for W oolsulate, Inc. to haul 
sufficient coke to keep the ·Company supplied at all times. 
W oolsulate, Inc. was engaged in the business of manu-
facturing insulation. Molyneaux was required to haul a 
minimum of 3 5 tons of coke per _week but he could haul 
additional amounts as he desired, limited only by the com-
pany's coke storage capacity. 
This court found that the work done by Molyneaux 
was not a part or process in the trade or business of Wool-
sul~te, Inc. The court said at page 140: 
uw oolsulate was in the business of manufac-
turing insulation. The record does not show that 
it was in the transportation or trucking business. 
It required coke for its business just as it required 
raw materials for its products. Some of the coke 
was delivered to it by railroad and some by truck. 
The company was primarily interested in obtaining 
the coke on time and having it deposited at conven-
ient places. How or when the coke was hauled, 
whether by large truck or small, by day or night, 
by direct or circuitous route, etc., was immaterial 
to it so long as it always had readily available suffi-
cient coke to operate its plant." 
The act of transporting cars, whether new or used, 
to the Wayne Rasmussen Company in Ogden, Utah, was 
not a ((part or process in the trade or business" of Wayne 
Rasmussen Company. Wayne Rasmussen Company was 
in the business of selling cars. There is no evidence that 
it was in the transportation business. It required cars for 
its business just as W oolsulate required coke and raw mate-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
rials for its products. The Wayne Rasmussen Company 
was primarily interested in obtaining used cars when 
business in the new car market slowed up a little (R. 47). 
How or when the cars were transported, whether by day 
or night, by direct or circuitous route, was immaterial so 
long as the Wayne Rasmussen Company had used cars 
to sell when the sale of new cars declined. 
The shipment of new cars to the Wayne Rasmussen 
Company would not be considered a part or proce5s of 
Rasmussen's business of selling cars and likewise the trans-
porting of used cars is not part of the trade or business 
of selling. The fact that Rasmussen's salesmen as well as 
others picked up the cars and drove them back to Ogderi 
does not make the work done part of the business of Ras-
mussen. The salesmen were employed to sell cars and not 
transport cars to Ogden. 
If transporting coke is not a part of the business of 
manufacturing insulation, then it reasonably follows that 
transporting cars is not a p~rt of the business of selling 
cars. 
The third test enunciated by this court in the Parkin-
son case is whether the work done or to be done is a 
definite job or piece of work. It is obvious that the work 
done by Dalton was a definite job. 
In a number of Utah cases, this Court has found a 
workman to be an independent contractor because of the 
absence of control by the employer and because the work-
ma.n was to do a definite piece of work. (Italics ours) In 
Kinder v. Industrial Com1nissi01t, 106 Utah 448, 150 
P.2d 109, this Court held a workman to be an independent 
contractor. The court found that the workman hauled 
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gravel in a truck owned by a third person and the Gravel 
Company paid the workman an agreed sum per yard for 
the gravel hauled, and gave him no directions as to the 
route to be travelled, the hours of work, the speed of the 
truck, or number of loads to be hauled per week or month, 
and exercised no control over his work except the right 
to direct. where to load and unload the gravel. In Luker 
Sand & Gravel Co., v. Industrial Commission, 82 Utah 188, 
23 P.2d 225, this Court found a workman to be an inde-
pendent contractor where the workman contracted to dig 
a foundation for a building at a fixed price and to haul 
gravel for a fixed charge per load. In Angel v. Industrial 
Commission, 64 Utah 105, 228 P. 509, this Court held a 
workman to be an independent contractor where the 
workman contracted to pour cement at a certain price 
per cubic foot, and whose work was supervised by the 
contractor only to the extent of satisfying himself that it 
was done in a workmanlike manner as the work pro-
gressed. In Gogoff v. Industrial Commission, 77 Utah 355, 
296 P. 229, this court held a workman to be an inde-
pendent contractor where he contracted to drill tunnels 
in a quarry. Applying the tests recited by this court in 
the Parkinson case supra to the case at bar, it is evident 
that Dalton was an independent contractor and not an 
employee. 
In Christean v. Industrial Commission, 113, Utah 451, 
196 P.2d 502; the court was confronted with the ques-
tion of whether Christean was an employee or an inde-
pendent contractor. This court considered it desirable 
to test the facts of the case with the factors set forth in 
the Restatement of the Law of Agency, paragraph 220, 
page 48 3, which are as follows: 
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. u ( 1) A servant is a person employed to per-
form service for another in his affairs and who, 
with respect to this physical conduct m the per ... 
· formance of the service, is subject to the other's 
control or right to control. 
(( ( 2) In determining whether one acting for 
another is a servant or an independent contractor, 
the following ,matters of fact, among others, are 
considered: 
((a. The extent of control which, by the agree-
ment, the master. may exercise over the details of 
the work; 
((b. whether or not the employed is engaged 
in a distinct occupation or business; 
((c. the kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done 
under the direction of the employer or by a special-
ist. without supervision; 
((d. the skill required in the particular occu-
pation; 
((e. whether the employer or the workman 
supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place 
of work for the person doing the work; 
((f. the length of time for which the person 
is employed; 
ug. the method of payment, whether by the 
time or by the job; 
uh. whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the employer; and 
ui. whether or not the parties believe they are 
creating the relationship of master and servant." 
In applying the foregoing tests to the facts of the 
case at bar, it is apparent that: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
u (a) the defendant had no cont~ol ov:er the 
details of the applicant's work; 
~c (b) the applicant is in a distinct business, 
namely, the automobile repair business; 
u (c) transporting· automobiles does not re-
quire ~ ~pecialist, but it is generally done without 
SU perVlSlOn; 
cc (d) transporting automobiles does not re-
quire any special skill; 
cc (e). the defendant supplied the automobile, 
but not the place of work; 
u (f) the fact that the job was to be com-
pleted in 12 to 18 hours indicates that it was a very 
short duration; 
cc (g) the method of payment, if any, was for 
the job and not by the hour; (Italics ours) 
u (h) the work is not part of the regular busi-
ness of the defendant, as he is in the business of 
selling new and used cars and not transporting 
automobiles; 
cc (i) there is no indication as to what relation-
ship the parties intended to create." 
Applying Criteria (a), (b), (f), (g), and (h) to the 
case at bar shows the Wayne Rasmussen Company did not 
have the right of control over Dalton. 
The various tests previously applied by this court have 
been used as aids in determining the primary question of 
whether the employer has the right to control the work-
men. A careful reading of the record shows beyond any 
doubt that the defendant did not have the right to control 
the plaintiff in the work he did and was only interested 
in the result-the arrival of the cars in Ogden. 
The appellant contends that the job done by Dalton 
and Porter was one ((which was regularly and most usually 
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performed by regular employees for a wage." The record 
does not support this assertion. Purkey, bookkeeper for 
the two companies, stated that sometimes Metheny and 
Hansen brought in the used cars, sometimes they get others 
to do it, other times, Mr. Rasmussen brought them in, and 
then there were other ((short-term employees". who were 
sent to bring the cars in. (R. 47, 48) 
When Naylor told Dalton he had two cars in Rock 
Springs, Naylor said he had a deal with ((somebody" to 
get them and they weren't going to, and it had caused an 
emergency. (R. 16) 
There is no evidence in the record that Metheny 
and Hansen were going to Rock Springs and Dalton 
and Porter were asked to take their place. The record is 
silent as to the identity of the usomebody" who was to 
pick up the cars. There is no showing in the record 
whatsoever as to whether these other people were regular 
employees or not. Dalton and. Porter did not step into the 
shoes of regular employees and do their job. 
The plaintiff has cited two cases which are allegedly 
analogous on their facts; Southern Pacific Company v. 
Industrial Co1nnzission, 71 Utah 248, 264 P. 965, and 
Utah Fire Clay Company v. Industrial Commission, 86 
Utah, 1, 40 P.2d 183. The facts in the Southern Pacific 
case are clearly distinguishable from the facts at bar. There 
the applicant was u:... :.'- * orally employed by the com-
pany's foreman of the section to cut the weeds at a daily 
wage of $6.50, he to furnish, as he did, his own team and 
mower; that he received instructions from the foreman 
as to the particular place to work; that his work was ex-
tended as in the judgment of the foreman the weed cutting 
along the right of way was needed; that he was subject 
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to discharge at the will or direction of the foreman; that 
the foreman or roadmaster of the company directed Sur-
rage where to start cutting, and when to change to other 
places· of the work; that a separate pay roll was kept for 
him and when he was injured, the foreman employed an-
other to finish the work." 
These facts clearly show an. employee-employer rela-
tionship and are not. similar to the facts at bar. 
In the Utah Fire Clay Company case supra, the facts 
again show an employer-employee relationship and are 
not similar to the case at bar. Here the evidence indi-
cated that the applicant had been driving a truck engaged 
in work for Utah Fire Clay for six or seven years; that 
the Fire Clay Company cc* * * controlled the actions of 
said drivers and directed them in the work they were to 
do, where they were to go, when they were to come to 
work, when they were through work, whether or not 
they could take vacations, what articles they were to haul 
and deliver, and when and where; that the said drivers 
returned after each trip to the Utah Fire Clay COmpany's 
plant for further orders and directions; the truck drivers 
had no right or option to refuse to do any of these things 
or to follow any directions given them by the Utah Fire 
Clay Company; that the Utah Fire Clay Company was 
the exclusive judge of when its work should be done by 
the truck drivers and the manner in which it should be 
done." Here the right to control the workman was ob-
viously retained by the employer. 
The plaintiff has also cited Plewe Construction Com-
pany v. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 373, 242 P. 2d 
561, as a recent Utah case dealing with the question of 
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whether a workman is an employee or an independent 
contractor. 
In the Plewe case, supra, the.Plewe Construction Com-
pany hired two roofers to shingle a roof. The two roofers 
employed a third man to expedite the work. The third 
man was injured when he fell from the roof. That the 
Plewe Construction Company retained the right to. con-
trol and did control the workmen in the labors is demon-
strated by the evidence. This court said: 
u* * * the Plewe Construction Company fur-
nished all the materials, decided where they were 
to be placed, told the workmen how to place the 
shingles and when to split them and to draw chalk 
lines before putting on the shingles so as to ensure 
straight lines." 
These cases involve factual situations where the em-
ployer clearly retained the right to control the workmen. 
In the case at bar, the Wayne Rasmussen Company did 
not retain the right to control Dalton in the service he per-
formed. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION GRANTED 
THE REHEARING FOR THE PURPOSE OF REDE-
TERMINING EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATION-
SHIP AND THE REASONABLENESS OF THE 
MEDICAL EXPENSES. 
After the Industrial Commission rendered its initial 
decision on October 9, 1957, defendants petitioned the 
court for a rehearing to uredetermine the question of 
whether or not there was a contract of employment exist-
ing between the defendant Wayne Rasmussen Company, 
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and applicant, Sherman S. Dalton at the time the applicant 
suffered the injuries complained of/' (R. 77) Defendants 
also requested the rehearing to. deternline if the medical ex-
penses incurred by the applicant were reasonable. The 
petition for rehearing was filed November 12, 1957. 
On December 4, 1957, counsel for plaintiff filed an 
argpment in opposition to rehearing. In this argument 
counsel acknowledged that the rehearing had been re-
quested for the purpose. of having the commission rede-
termine the employment question as well as the reason-
ableness of the medical expenses. His argument was 
addressed to both questions. On December 5th, the In-
dustrial Commission wrote an ex parte letter to counsel for 
plaintiff informing him that the transcript contained no 
evidence regarding medical and hospital expenses and in 
this case there had been a large bill submitted to defendants. 
The letter further stated ccThey (defendants) are entitled 
to have the Commission determine this issue." 
The rehearing was held on February 10, 1958. At 
the rehearing the commission made the following state-
ment: 
uThis case was heard on October 17, 1956, 
and award was made by the Commission October 
9, 1957. 
The petition for rehearing was filed November 
12, 1957. Order granting the rehearing Novem-
ber 26, 1957. 
This is a hearing de novo, gentlemen, and I 
assume that you're willing to stipulate that the 
transcript of the proceedings of the O·ctober 17, 
1956, hearing may be received in evidence? 
Mr. Aadnesen: So stipulated. 
Mr. Black: So stipulate, your Honor. 
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The Commissioner: Now, the defendants .asked 
for a rehearing for the purpose ·of determining 
the reasonableness of the medical expenses claimed 
by the applicant, and defendants also question the 
employer-employee relationship. I understand the 
defendants have filed a memorandum. Is that on 
this question of employment? 
. Mr. Aadnesen: That's. the employment ques-
tion. 
The Commissioner: You want some time to 
answer that, Mr. Black? 
Mr. Black: Yes, I would. 
The Commissioner: How long? 
Mr. Black: Well, twenty days. 
The Commissioner: All right. The counsel 
for applicant will be given twenty days to :file a 
reply memorandum to the memorandum of the 
defendant. (R. 84, 8 5) . 
You may proceed, Mr. Aadnesen." 
At the rehearing, the commissioner stated that the 
proceeding was a hearing de 11ovo. Counsel for plaintiff 
stipulated that the transcript of proceedings of October 
17, 1956 could be introduced in evidence. Counsel for 
plaintiff did not object to the proceeding being a hearing 
de novo nor to the fact that the commissioner stated that 
the rehearing was for the purpose of determining the 
reasonableness of the medical expenses and the employee-
employer relationship nor to the introduction of the 
transcript of proceedings of October 17, 1956. By fall-
ing to make any objections to the proceedings at the time 
the rehearing was held, counsel for plaintiff waived his 
objections. 
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The order granting the rehearing did not limit the 
issues. The order stated: 
((IT IS ORDERED that the request for Re-
hearing filed herein by defendant's attorney on the 
12th day of November, 1957, be, and the same is 
hereby granted." (R. 78) 
In Carter v. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 520, 
290 P. 776, at 783 this court stated: 
«The effect of granting the rehearing, unless 
otherwise restricted or limited, was to vacate and 
set aside the prior order or judgment of the com-
mission and try the case anew." 
That the Commission intended to reconsider the ap-
plication in its entirety is apparent from the statement of 
the Commission that the proceeding was a hearing de novo. 
Defendant complied with the law in :filing its appli-
cation for rehearing. The Utah statute regarding rehearing 
is as follows: 
35-1-82. Rehearing before commission.-
Any party including the commission of :finance to 
a proceeding before the commission may, and be-
fore he can seek a review in the Supreme COurt 
shall, within thirty days after written notice of 
its decision file an application before the commis-
sion for a rehearing of the matter. 
In Pinyon Queen Mining Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 59 Utah 402, 204 P. 3~3, counsel for the applicant 
moved that the record and proceedings returned by the 
Industrial Commission on rehearing be stricken for the 
reason that no notice of application for rehearing was 
ever served upon the applicant or his counsel and no op-
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portunity was ever given the applicant to be heard re-
specting the motion for rehearing. 
In response to the contention this court stated: 
(P. 324) 
((There is no formal hearing on a motion for 
rehearing, and when a petition for rehearing is 
pending it is properly disposed of ex parte. If 
denied, the adverse party has no cause for com-
plaint, and, if granted, the parties are given notice 
of the rehearing, as was done in the instant case, 
by the Commission. The statute provides that the 
Industrial Commission shall not be bound by any 
technical or formal rules of procedure other than 
in the statute provided. Notice of the hearing on 
the petition for rehearing is not provided by the 
statute and no valid reason has been given why 
such notice should be required by the Commission. 
After the rehearing was granted, applicant was 
given notice of the second hearing, and thus all 
his rights were fully protected." 
After the rehearing was granted in the case at bar, 
plaintiff was given notice of the date for the rehearing and 
thus all his rights were fully protected. 
CONCLUSION 
The record supports the order of the Commission 
that Dalton was either a volunteer or an independent con-
tractor. The $25.00 given to Dalton and Porter was for 
expenses and not for wages. Even if this court should 
:find that Dalton was not a volunteer, then it must follow 
that he was an independent contractor. 
This court has previously stated that the most impor-
tant of the determinatives of the relationship between em-
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ployer and workman is that of control. In determining 
whether the right to control exists all the facts and cir-
cumstances of the relationship must be examined. Control 
broken down into its elements includes the when, the 
where and the how. Dalton had the right to determine 
when he returned to Ogden, where he drove, and how he 
drove, whether fast or slow, behind or around traffic and 
whether on the inside or outside lane of traffic. (Italics 
ours). Under the right to control test and the other tests 
announced by this court, Dalton was not an employee of 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company at the time he was 
injured. The appellant has failed to show that the record 
preponderates against the ·Conclusion of the Commission. 
The petition for rehearing requested the Commission 
to redetermine the question of whether there was an em-
ployee-employer relationship existing between Dalton and 
the Wayne Rasmussen Company at the time Dalton was 
injured. The order granting the rehearing did not limit 
the issues. When the rehearing was held the Commissioner 
stated that the proceeding was a hearing de novo to deter-
mine if there was an employee-employer relationship and 
if the medical expenses were reasonable. Counsel for 
plaintiff did not object to the Commissioner's statement 
and having failed to oppose that action he has waived his 
objections. 
The denial of compensation should be affirmed. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
GRANT C. AADNESEN, 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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